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STUDENT ARTICLE
ZERO TOLERANCE FOR FORFEITURE: A CALL
FOR REFORM OF CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW
CHRISTINE MEYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 1986 the New York Times ran a front page story
about the latest tactic used by the police in the "war on
drugs."' During the previous week in Manhattan, 43 motorists
were stopped while cruising in their cars. Not only were these
people arrested for possessing crack, but their cars were seized.
The majority of the owners of the cars taken were from middle-
class suburban communities.2 Since the date of the story, over
3,000 cars have been seized.3
In April, 1991, the New York Times ran a story about a
recent raid and seizure of the three University of Virginia fra-
ternity houses.4 The fraternity houses were seized because
drug dealing took place on their premises.5 Should convictions
occur, alumni corporations that own the houses could claim
they were "innocent owners" unaware of drug activity. How-
ever, if their defense fails, the houses, said to be worth $1 mil-
lion, would become the property of the federal government
and the Charlottesville police could claim their share, which
could exceed $500,000.6 Federal law authorizes the seizure of
* B.A. Business Administration, University of Washington; J.D., Notre
Dame Law School, 1991. This article is dedicated to the memory of my
father, Gary E. Hoglund.
1. Purdum, New York Police Now Seizing Cars in Arrests for Possession of
Crack, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
2. Id. In a four day period, which ended the previous Saturday, 30 cars
were taken. Since July 30, 1986, 211 cars were seized. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,
1986, at BI, col. 1.
3. Farber, For Out-of-Towners, New York City is a Drug Mart, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1989, at A23, col. 2.
4. Anderson, Mixed Messages From a Drug Bust, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1991
at A10, col. 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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assets used to facilitate drug dealing.7 The Feds may sell the
seized assets and share the proceeds with local law enforce-
ment agencies according to the agencies' level of participa-
tion.' This is just one example of how forfeiture is being
utilized to combat the drug problem. Forfeiture statutes have
been in existence for many years, but until recently were not
used very often and were targeted at drug dealers and traffick-
ers.9 The statutes, however, are now being reinterpreted and
used to reach people from all social strata, and have resulted in
many citizens losing their cars, boats, land or any other prop-
erty deemed to have been used as an "instrument" in a drug
transaction.' ° People must forfeit their property even if they
are not a drug dealer, but a first-time offender or a recreational
user in possession of a small quantity of drugs. Policies such as
the one in New York are specifically aimed at, and attempt to
deter use by, middle-class drug buyers.
While civil forfeiture may be an effective tactic, in many
cases it is not a fair one. People are forfeiting hundreds of
thousands of dollars in property for buying and selling drugs,
regardless of the amount. In addition, "under federal forfei-
ture laws, the government need not actually find drugs; forfei-
ture can occur when the owner merely intended to use the
property to facilitate a drug law violation."" The result is
often a loss of property much greater than warranted by the
underlying offense and a "radical growth in the power and
authority of the state over the individual citizen."12
Examples of this policy include forfeiture of a shrimp boat
after U.S. Coast Guard personnel found three grams of mari-
juana stems and seeds,'" forfeiture of all worldly possessions,
including the house, clothing, food and bank accounts, of a
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Lauter, U.S. Seizure of Assets Accelerates, THE NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6,
1982, at 8, col. 4; Kessler, State's Criminal Forfeiture Law - Is it Working After
Two Years?, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 18, 1986, at 6, col. 2; Note, Fear and Loathing and
the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1990) [hereinafter Fear].
10. Strasser, Forfeiture Isn't Only for Drug Kingpins, THE NAT'L LJ., July
17, 1989, at 26, col. 2. During the calendar year 1988 in Broward County
Florida the following were forfeited: 50 vehicles valued at $208,000, 2 boats
valued at $10,000, 3 planes valued at $180,000, cash amounting to
$511,231.05 and miscellaneous property worth $6,600. See also Fear, supra
note 4, at 1151.
11. Herpel, United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, REASON, May
1990, at 34.
12. Chambers, Civil Penalty is Becoming Powerful Tool, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 17, 1990, at 13, col. 4.
13. Herpel, supra note 11, at 33.
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Massachusetts resident suspected of dealing drugs,' 4 and many
instances when defendants were prosecuted and sent to prison
for growing marijuana in their back yards. In these last cases
the government seized not only the gardens where the mari-
juana grew, but the entire parcel of land, including all buildings
upon it.1 5
The federal statute used as the basis for these seizures is
21 U.S.C. § 881.16 Since courts view this statute as civil, rather
than criminal, the constitutional safeguards which surround
criminal proceedings are not available. The government must
only show by a preponderance of evidence that the car, or
other property, was used as an instrument in a drug transac-
tion. This standard is in contrast with the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard mandated for a criminal prosecution.'
Thus, the government need not bring any type of criminal
prosecution against the claimant before the institution of a for-
feiture action. Under federal law (the model for legislation in
the individual states),
the petitioner has the burden of defense while the prose-
cutor has no burden of proof; a car found with a single
marijuana seed can be subject to forfeiture; innocence is
only sometimes a defense; hearsay is admissible evidence
and acquittal of the alleged offender has no bearing on
the civil case. 8 .
As one commentator noted, "Given all of these advantages
over criminal prosecutions, it is no wonder that forfeiture
became, in the words of the Justice Department, 'one of the
primary law enforcement tools of the 1980s.' "19
14. Id.
15. Chambers, supra note 12, at 13, col. 4.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) Subject property. The following shall be subject
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured,
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this title.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind
which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing,
compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any
controlled substance in violation of this title.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a
container for property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels,
which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any
manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or
concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2) ....
17. Chambers, supra note 12.
18. Strasser, supra note 10, at 27, col. 1.
19. Herpel, supra note 11, at 34.
1991]
856 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
The foundation for civil forfeiture is a medieval doctrine
under which an inanimate object can be guilty of wrongdoing.
When we combine the origin and operation of civil forfeiture
law it is hard to disagree, as one author opines, "that they [the
origin and operation of civil forfeiture laws] are fundamentally
incompatible with the principles of a free society. "20
The forfeiture mechanism described above, while hailed by
law enforcement officials and prosecutors, 2' has also been
attacked for violating Constitutional rights. One challenge is
that certain forfeitures constitute "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," which is prohibited under the eighth amendment. The
Supreme Court has held that "cruel and unusual punishment"
includes penalties that are disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted.23 In many instances, the amount of property forfeited
under § 881 is vastly disproportionate to the underlying
offense.
In July, 1990, state prosecutors and the Justice Depart-
ment suffered a major defeat when the influential National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rejected
a tough, much-lobbied-for model forfeiture act. This legisla-
tion was aimed at expanding federal-style forfeiture statutes to
all fifty states. 24 The drafting committee was asked to come
back with language requiring courts to apply a proportionality
test.2 ' This rejection of forfeiture legislation is indicative of the
growing concern about the disproportionality which occurs
under current civil forfeiture laws.
This essay will address disproportionality under the eighth
amendment in the context of civil forfeiture, and, after discuss-
ing the history and problems surrounding civil forfeiture, will
conclude that the current federal civil forfeiture statute (21
U.S.C. § 881) should be amended. The following is an exam-
ple of the problem that exists under current forfeiture law. In
New York, a person convicted of the crime of possession of a
controlled substance is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor,2 6
which allows a maximum monetary fine of $1,000.27 However,
20. Herpel, supra note 11, at 33.
21. deCourcy Hinds, States are Seeking Tougher Laws on Seizing Property in
Drug Cases, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at All, col. 3.
22. Id.
23. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
24. Model Forfeiture Act for the States is Rejected, THE NAT'L L.J., July 30,
1990, at 5, col. 2.
25. Id.
26. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.03 (McKinney 1982).
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05 (McKinney 1982).
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under the civil forfeiture statutes, citizens can lose their prop-
erty, prior to, and regardless of, a criminal conviction. 28
Should a person face a civil penalty resulting in a greater pun-
ishment than that which would be allowed by the criminal pro-
cess? This author thinks not.
Consider the following hypothetical: one man drives in a
BMW to a streetcorner where he purchases 2 grams of mari-
juana; another drives in an old VW bug and executes the same
transaction; finally, a third man simply walks to the corner to
purchase his 2 grams of marijuana. Assume the previous trans-
actions all took place in New York, where it is not a crime to
possess less than 25 grams of marijuana.29 If all three are sub-
jected to civil forfeiture, the first man is out $35,000, the sec-
ond is out $3,500 and the third has not lost a thing. Even if this
took place outside of New York, it is hard to imagine anyone
being fined $35,000 for possession of 2 grams of marijuana."0
The above example illustrates the bizarre outcomes possi-
ble under current forfeiture laws. In these cases the forfeiture
is disproportionate to the offense committed. Statutes should
not allow forfeitures which are significantly disproportionate to
the offense committed. The following is a suggested amend-
ment to the current federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7):
(C) no property shall be forfeited under the provisions of
this section where the fair market value of the property exceeds
the maximum fine which could be imposed for the relevant
criminal offense, except that,
(1) where the property is determined to be substantially
connected to its owner's criminal activity subsection (C) shall
not apply and the property shall be forfeited.
(D) where property is not subject to forfeiture under sub-
section (C), the owner of the property may be required to pay a
fine equal to, but not greater than, the fine that would be
imposed for the relevant criminal offense as a precondition to
the release of his or her property from custody.
28. Chambers, supra note 12.
29. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, 221.10 (McKinney 1982).
30. For this argument, see also Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some
Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S. C. § 881,
9 WnIrrER L. REV. 27, 31 (1987) ("... [in the case of conveyances, the
vehicle may only be peripherally and non-exclusively connected with the
drugs. For example, it may have only been used to bring its owner to a place
where an exchange is to take place, or only momentarily used to conceal or
transport drugs. Thus, forfeiture of these items seems more punitive...").
1991]
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(E) where an individual is subsequently found free of any
criminal wrong-doing, any forfeited property, or money, shall
be returned promptly.
Statutory limits would be set, establishing a minimum and
maximum amount of property that could be forfeited for a
given quantity of drugs. This would allow the court to be flexi-
ble in determining whether a forfeiture is proportionate under
a given set of circumstances. The upper limit would be equal
to the fine for the underlying criminal offense.
To illustrate, I will use a variation on the above hypotheti-
cal. Suppose the quantity of drugs involved is five grams of
marijuana. I will asume that the criminal fine for this offense
would be $5,000. The statutory guidelines for this quantity of
drugs would allow forfeitures of property valued at $3,000-
5,000. The person who drives to purchase drugs in his BMW
valued at $35,000 would not have to forfeit the vehicle, as it is
far beyond the statutory range and is valued at seven times the
statutory fine for the underlying criminal offense. Instead he
would pay $5,000. The person who drives to purchase drugs in
his VW bug, valued at $3,500. would forfeit his vehicle, as it is
within the established range and is valued at less the statutory
fine. The person who walked to the corner would merely pay
$5,000:
An extremely important point to remember is that my pro-
posal only pertains to the civil forfeiture aspect of the proceed-
ings. If a person is found guilty of criminal wrongdoing then
the criminal process takes over. Thus, even if a person does
not have to forfeit his property under civil forfeiture laws, such
as the BMW driver above, he may have to do so anyway under
criminal forfeiture laws. Under criminal forfeiture law, if a per-
son is convicted of a drug offense he must forfeit all property
that was purchased with "drug money" or is substantially con-
nected with drug smuggling. 31
In the above example then, if the BMW driver bought his
car with proceeds derived from the drug business, he would
have to forfeit it pursuant to criminal forfeiture laws. Also, if
he was involved in reselling the drugs he purchased such that
the BMW was an integral part of his business of buying and
selling drugs, then the criminal forfeiture statutes would also
require him to forfeit his car. If, however, the BMW was used
solely as a means of transportation for him to drive to the cor-
31. Fear, supra note 9, at n.39 (21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (West 1981
& Supp. 1989) (property connected with drugs)).
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ner to buy drugs for personal consumption, then forfeiture of
the car is not warranted, which is the essence of this essay.
II. DISPROPORTIONALITY AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. Civil Forfeiture is Punishment
Before arguing that civil forfeiture results in a punishment
that is disproportionate to the crime committed, it must be
established that civil forfeiture does in fact constitute punish-
ment. Punishment, characteristically,
is unpleasant. It is inflicted on an offender because of an
offense he has committed; it is deliberately imposed, not
just the natural consequence of a person's action (like a
hang-over), and the unpleasantness is essential to it, not
an accidental accompaniment to some other treatment
(like the pain of the dentist's drill). It is imposed by an
agent authorized by the system of rules against which an
offense has been committed; a lynching is not a standard
case of punishment.3 2
It is clear that civil forfeiture is a form of punishment.
When citizens are deprived of their personal property, it is cer-
tainly unpleasant. The forfeiture of property takes place pursu-
ant to the commission of an offense and is deliberately
imposed. Moreover, in the case of civil forfeiture, a person
need only be suspected of committing an offense, as his prop-
erty can be forfeited prior to a criminal conviction. Finally, for-
feiture is imposed by law enforcement agents, who are
authorized by the system of rules against which the offense is
committed.
Civil forfeiture was created and traditionally used for
remedial, as opposed to punitive, purposes. However, civil for-
feiture is currently being used in ways that are much more akin
to its criminal counterpart and has survived challenge because
of its "civil" label. Regardless of the remedial purposes that
may be served by civil forfeiture, the end result is punishment.
"Forfeiture is considered a punitive sanction when it is used
without regard to actual damage caused, particularly when the
property forfeited is not contraband, but an asset which the
defendant has a legal right to possess," wrote Kenneth Mann,
an expert on white-collar law." When citizens forfeit clothes,
cars, boats and homes, they are losing assets which are right-
32. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29 (P.
Edwards ed. 1967).
33. Quoted in Chambers, supra note 12, at 13, col. 4.
1991)
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fully and legally theirs.3 4 Since civil forfeiture is a punishment,
the government should be required to observe procedural and
proportionality restraints throughout the course of the
proceedings.
In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held a statute which
provided that a citizen "shall lose his nationality by deserting
the military ...in time of war . . ." unconstitutional.3 5 The
Court held that § 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 violated
the eighth amendment because it was penal in nature and pre-
scribed cruel and unusual punishment.36 In Trop, the Court
wrote that the words of the [eighth] amendment are not precise
and their scope is not static.3 7 Further, determined the Court,
"the Judiciary has the duty of implementing the constitutional
safeguards that protect individual rights. The provisions of the
Constitution are the rules of the government, and the princi-
ples that authorize as well as limit governmental powers. '"38
"When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one of
these provisions," said the Court, "we have no choice but to
enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution. 31 9 Civil
forfeiture, in many cases, does conflict with the provisions of
the Constitution. A statute which allows the government to
take people's private property, even though the value of the
property greatly exceeds any monetary fine that would be
imposed upon conviction of the suspected offense, is a statute
which gives the government too much power over the individ-
ual citizen. Constitutional limits should not be pushed back to
accommodate popular legislation.
B. Development of Disproportionality
My claim that gross disproportionality between the offense
committed and the penalty received is violative of the eighth
amendment is based on the case of Solem v. Helm.4" In Solem,
the Court explained that "[t]he principle that a punishment
34. Of course, this assumes that the forfeiture is being imposed on a
citizen who is not in the business of buying and selling drugs, but is only
purchasing a small amount of a controlled substance for personal
consumption. In the case of an individual who derives his livelihood from the
drug business and purchased the forfeited property with drug money, then
the property is not rightfully or legally his and is subject to forfeiture under
criminal forfeiture laws.
35. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 100-01.
38. Id. at 103.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court said that the final
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should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and fre-
quently repeated in common-law jurisprudence."'" This prin-
ciple was repeated in the English Bill of Rights,4 2 and when the
Framers of the eighth amendment adopted the language of the
English Bill of Rights, they also adopted the English principles
of proportionality.4" The Supreme Court has recognized the
Constitutional principle of proportionality for almost a century,
and in the leading case of Weems v. United States held, "it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be gradu-
ated and proportioned to [the] offense."44 The Court went on
to endorse proportionality as a constitutional standard, saying,
"the eighth amendment prohibits penalties that are grossly dis-
proportionate to the offense."45
In the landmark case, Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
held that the sentence of death for the crime of rape was
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment forbidden
by the eighth amendment.4" The Court cited many cases hold-
ing that "the eighth amendment bars not only those punish-
ments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in
relation to the crime committed."4 7 The Court in Gregg gave
two grounds for determining that a punishment is "excessive"
and unconstitutional, and said that a punishment could fail the
test on either ground. The first ground is "a punishment which
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of pun-
ishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering."'4 For purposes of
this article it is the second ground which is of primary interest,
that being a punishment that "is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime."'49 Such a punishment is "excessive"
and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Civil forfeiture often results in a penalty vastly dispropor-
tionate to the crime committed, and in some cases is even
clause of the eighth amendment prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but
also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
41. Id. at 284.
42. 1 Win. & Mary, 2d Sess. (1689) c. 2.
43. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284-86.
44. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
45. Id. at 372-73.
46. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
47. Id. at 592. (The Court cited Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910)).
48. Id. at 592.
49. Id.
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applied when no crime has been committed at all. Possession
or purchase of small quantities of drugs is a crime, but it is not
so heinous as to warrant forfeiture of items such as cars, boats
and land. People who sell large quantities of drugs - drug traf-
fickers - should be, and are (under criminal forfeiture statutes),
made to forfeit any assets used in their "business" or
purchased with drug proceeds. However, people's private
property not used in furtherance of the drug trade, nor
purchased with "drug money," should not be subject to forfei-
ture. When an individual buys a gram of marijuana for personal
consumption, he should be fined, but his car should not be for-
feited. When a joint is found on a yacht, the owner should be
fined, but his yacht should not be forfeited. When an ounce of
cocaine is found in someone's home, they should be penalized,
but he should not forfeit his home. These examples show how
the goals of the statute break down and result in disproportion-
ate penalties.
Disproportionality in the area of criminal forfeiture has
been recognized as a legitimate concern. Under requirements,
published in 1989, the Justice Department's organized crime
and racketeering section ". . . will consider the nature and
severity of the offense when determining the extent of forfei-
ture to be sought."5 ° "The rules also state flatly, for the first
time, that in pursuing a forfeiture action, the government will
try to make the punishment fit the crime .. .. [D]epartment
policy.., is not to seek the fullest forfeiture permissible under
the law where that forfeiture would be disproportionate to the
defendant's crime."''S In spite of such developments, the dis-
proportionality problem remains in civil forfeiture, where the
eighth amendment, currently, has no power.52
50. Controversial Rules on Asset Seizure Modified, THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30,
1989, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter Controversial] (The U.S. Justice Department, in
response to heavy criticism, has imposed limits on the use of pretrial
restraining orders aimed at defendants' assets. The organized crime and
racketeering section will review any proposed forfeiture temporary
restraining order, and U.S. attorneys must show that "less intrusive remedies
are not likely to preserve the assets for forfeiture in the event of a
conviction." In addition, prosecutors have to describe fully any anticipated
impact that forfeiture and the restraining order would have on innocent third
parties - such as investors or creditors - and balance those effects against
the government's need to preserve assets. Finally, prosecutors are required
to state publicly, as soon as possible, that the government will try not to
disrupt the normal, legitimate business activities of the defendant nor seek to
take back from third parties any assets they have received legitimately from
the defendant").
51. Id.
52. See United States v. Santaro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989)
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C. The Excessive Fines Clause - The Browning-Ferris Case
In addition to prohibiting penalties that are disproportion-
ate to the crime, the eighth amendment provides that "exces-
sive fines shall not be imposed." The excessive fines clause,
like the cruel and unusual punishment clause, has only been
applied to criminal proceedings. In Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the excessive
fines clause of the eighth amendment does not apply to awards
of punitive damages in cases between private parties.5" In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor provided a compelling argument for
not confining the excessive fines clause to criminal cases. The
Browning-Ferris case, and Justice O'Connor's dissent therein,
provide a solid foundation for the argument that the eighth
amendment in its entirety should be applicable to civil forfei-
ture proceedings.
Browning-Ferris was in the business of commercial waste
collection and disposal in Vermont. The company was sued by
one of its major competitors for violating the federal Sherman
Act and Vermont tort law. A federal district court jury ruled
against Browning-Ferris on both claims. In considering the
state tort claim, the jury determined that punitive as well as
compensatory damages were warranted and decided on $6 mil-
lion as the appropriate punitive damages amount.5 4 Browning-
Ferris appealed its case. In reviewing the damage award, the
Second Circuit noted that it amounted to "less than .5% of
Browning-Ferris's revenues . .. for fiscal year 1986."'1 The
court assumed, for argument's sake, that the excessive fines
clause applied to punitive damages, but the court concluded,
("to judicially encumber what clearly is intended to be a civil proceeding with
criminal procedural safeguards is contrary to the plain dictates of Congress.
We share this view and decline to extend eighth amendment protections to
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)"); United States v. 1985 BMW, 677 F. Supp. 1039,
1041 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (". . . the court finds that the statute is civil in nature
and that an Eighth Amendment analysis is unnecessary"); and Chambers,
supra note 12, at 14 ("the eighth amendment, the courts remind the defense
bar, applies to criminal and not to civil cases").
53. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909
(1989). (Respondents filed suit against petitioners, charging Browning-Ferris
Industries with antitrust violations and with interfering with Kelco's
contractual relations in violation of Vermont tort law. A jury found
Browning-Ferris Industries liable on both counts, and awarded Kelco, in
addition to $51,146 in compensatory damages, $6 million in punitive
damages on the state-law claim.)
54. Id.
55. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d
Cir. 1988).
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that this award was not "so disproportionate as to be cruel,
unusual, or constitutionally excessive."56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the excessive
fines clause issue, and found no constitutional violation, on the
ground that the clause does not pertain to damages awarded in
a private civil action." In her dissent, Justice O'Connor criti-
cized the Court for confining the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment to criminal cases, asserting that there was
no historical basis for doing so. Justice O'Connor wrote, "[i]n
my view, a chronological account of the clause and its anteced-
ents demonstrates that the clause derives from limitations in
English law on monetary penalties exacted in civil and criminal
cases to punish and deter misconduct."5 " Although Browning-
Feris specifically dealt with the excessive fines clause, the analy-
sis employed by Justice O'Connor is equally compelling when
applied to the clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment, as the two really go hand in hand with respect to civil
forfeiture. Civil forfeitures both "exact monetary penalties"
and can result in extreme disproportionality. As with the
excessive fines clause, the cruel and unusual punishment clause
should not be restricted in its application to criminal
proceedings .
Justice O'Connor echoed the view that the eighth amend-
ment in its entirety should not be confined to criminal proceed-
ings. She noted that there was little debate over the eighth
amendment in the First Congress, and further, there were no
proposals to limit that amendment to criminal proceedings.
Justice O'Connor provides a detailed discussion of the histori-
cal background surrounding the eighth amendment and con-
cludes that, "around the time of the framing and enactment of
the eighth amendment some courts and commentators
believed that the word 'fine' encompassed civil penalties."'
Justice O'Connor cites a holding of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court that "the word 'fine' in a statute meant 'forfeit-
ures and penalties recoverable in civil actions, as well as pecu-
niary punishments inflicted by sentence.' "61 The Supreme
Court, contrary to historical evidence and Justice O'Connor's
argument, has decided that the eighth amendment has no place
in civil proceedings such as forfeitures.
56. Id. at 410.
57. 109 S. Ct. at 2909.
58. Id. at 2926.
59. Id. at 2930.
60. Id. at 2931.
61. Id. (quoting Hanscomb v. Russell, 77 Mass. 373, 375 (1858)).
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III. HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
When a middle-class, suburban citizen is stopped by the
police and a very small quantity of drugs is found in his or her
car, the government has the preponderance of evidence it
needs for a forfeiture action. Based on this evidence, the auto-
mobile is subsequently forfeited, because it is viewed as being
an instrumentality used in a drug transaction. On the surface,
this forfeiture is punishment for a crime. The above scenario is
clearly "criminal" in nature. Why is it termed "civil" such that
this kind of forfeiture is seemingly immune from constitutional
reproach?
Courts historically distinguished between criminal and civil
forfeiture. At common law, the value of an inanimate object
directly or indirectly causing the accidental death of a King's
subject was forfeited to the Crown as deodand.62 The origins
of the deodand6" are traceable to Biblical' and pre-Judeo-
Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instru-
ment of death was accursed and that religious expiation was
required.65 While deodands never became a common-law tra-
dition in the United States, the concept behind them, forfei-
ture, did. "Long before the adoption of the Constitution the
common law courts in the Colonies - and later in the states
during the period of Confederation - were exercising jurisdic-
tion in rem in the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture
statutes."66 Because the rule regarding deodands was pre-
mised on the guilt of the property itself, property was forfeita-
ble regardless of the guilt or innocence of the owner.67 The
classical distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture was
born and this tradition still holds true today.
62. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680
(1974).
63. Id. at 681, n. 16. Deodand derives from the Latin Deodandum, to be
"given to God."
64. See Exodus 21:28 ("[I]f an ox gore a man or a woman and they die,
he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten").
65. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681
(1974). (The value of the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief
that the King would provide the money for Masses to be said for the good of
the dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was put to charitable uses. 1
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 300.
66. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943) (Under
classical in rem forfeiture, "the thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing . ); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827).
67. Herpel, supra note 11, at 34.
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The two different types of forfeitures are technically
known as in personam and in rem. Forfeiture against the person
operates in personam and requires a conviction before any prop-
erty can actually be taken. This type of forfeiture is regarded as
criminal in nature because it is penal, and primarily seeks to
punish.68 Forfeiture against the thing is in rem and the forfei-
ture is based upon the unlawful use of the res, irrespective of its
owner's culpability. These forfeitures are regarded as civil;
their purpose is remedial.69 Note that under both types of for-
feiture property is taken. In one instance it is called punish-
ment, in one instance it is not.
One court states that civil forfeiture statutes serve reme-
dial purposes such as stripping the drug trade of its instrumen-
talities and denying drug dealers the proceeds of ill-gotten
gains.7 0 The legislative history of § 881, illustrates that Con-
gress intended this penalty to attach to drug dealers and not to
drug users.71 The legislative history states that the goal of the
statute is to increase research, to penalize drug dealers, and to
encourage drug users to seek treatment.7 "
These remedial purposes are useful and legitimate; the
statutes, however, are used to go beyond these noble goals to
impose penalties on persons. Seizing a person's car or other
property does not directly encourage him or her to seek treat-
ment, nor does it directly encourage research.73 The statutes,
much more directly and effectively, achieve the criminal goals
of punishment and deterrence. Traditionally, criminal and civil
proceedings have maintained a separate existence, but with the
increased use of civil forfeiture, the two are beginning to over-
lap. With civil forfeiture we see the worst of both worlds; pro-
ceedings and penalties which appear criminal, but which do not
enjoy constitutional protection.
IV. THE GuiuTY PROPERTY FICTION
The ancient doctrine of deodand and the idea of guilty
property are fictional notions that have no place in modern for-
feiture actions, and lead to unjust results. An example of this is
the Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. case. In Calero-
68. See United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1076-77.
70. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
71. Fear, supra note 9, at 1155.
72. H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566.
73. Fear, supra note 9, at 1155.
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Toledo, a leased pleasure yacht was seized and forfeited under
the statutes of Puerto Rico after police found marijuana
aboard."4 Despite the fact that only one marijuana cigarette
was found and that the owner/lessor was innocent because he
could not control the lessee's activities, the yacht, valued at
$20,000, was forfeited.75 The Court held that the appellee vol-
untarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the yacht and
that no proof was offered that the company did all that it rea-
sonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful
use.76 In his dissent, Justice Douglas pointed out that, ". . .the
ancient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate object
itself is guilty of wrongdoing." 77 Justice Douglas, quite cor-
rectly, recognized that the notion of the property as being the
wrongdoer is mere fiction, and is used in an attempt to circum-
vent Constitutional challenges.
In this case we see in rem forfeiture at work. Innocence of
the owner is completely irrelevant, for it is not he that is the
accused, but rather the yacht itself. Because of this strange
doctrine, forfeiture cases are always brought, not against peo-
ple, but against objects. However, inanimate objects simply
cannot be guilty of culpable conduct. It is true that such items
as cars, boats and land are often used as instruments of the
drug trade and that through forfeiture such "tools of the trade"
can, and should, be disposed of. On the other hand, where
such items are not used in connection with someone's business
of selling drugs and are not bought with drug proceeds, but
instead are items of personal property that are used only as a
means of transportation or as a residence, it is ludicrous to say
that the property is guilty of wrongdoing and must therefore be
forfeited.
Seizing a person's car, boat or land under civil forfeiture
law, under the guise that it is the property which is at fault, is
an extremely potent weapon for law enforcement. "Through
this statute, [21 U.S.C. § 881] Congress has expanded the
nation's war on drugs to every piece of real property involved
in the narcotics trade."7 Unlike criminal forfeiture, the prop-
erty may be taken by showing merely a preponderance of evi-
dence, (more likely than not), and is taken before any criminal
proceedings are instituted, much less before any determination
74. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id. at 693.
78. United States v. Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Five and
No/100 Dollars in U.S. Currency, 869 F.2d at 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989).
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of guilt has been made. In criminal forfeiture proceedings, as
mentioned previously, the standard of proof is beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, (meaning virtual certainty), and, of course,
there are numerous Constitutional safeguards to protect the
defendant during the course of the proceedings.79 As one
commentator has noted, civil forfeitures "have the effect of
punishing crime without criminal process. '"80
Other legal professionals have made similar attacks on the
problems with the characterization of the forfeiture proceed-
ings as civil, and the resulting infringement on eighth amend-
ment rights. In 1989, top law enforcement officials in New
York announced a plan to "significantly strengthen the state's
civil forfeiture law." 8' Norman Siege, executive director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union, expressing his opposition to
the proposal and questioning the constitutionality of the plan,
commented, "too often, the forfeiture laws are simply used as a
form of summary punishment . . . and imposition of penalties
that are vastly disproportionate to the crimes that have been
committed." 2 William J. Hughes (D-N.J.), Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Crime, expressing his doubts about
civil forfeiture, was quoted as saying, "the penalty has to fit the
crime. Forfeiture is an important tool, and I have some con-
cerns when it is not balanced, not reasonable." 3 He also
pointed out an important problem with distinguishing certain
types of forfeitures as "civil," saying, "in some states the pen-
alty for possession of marijuana is a small fine, and you would
have to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [h]ere you can
be fined millions by just proving probable cause. Calling this a
civil proceeding is pure fiction. '"84
The fiction of "guilty property" is, in the words of Black-
stone, a superstition inherited from the "blind days of
popury" 85 and is used to label an essentially criminal process as
civil, such that the eighth amendment prohibition against dis-
proportionate punishment may be avoided in the context of
certain forfeiture proceedings, as demonstrated by Calero-
79. Examples of such safeguards are the fifth amendment protections
against self incrimination and double jeopardy, and the sixth amendment
right to counsel.
80. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
383 (1988).
81. Fox, New Anti-Drug Drive by State Law Enforcers, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10,
1989, at 1, col. 5.
82. Id. at 2, col. 1.
83. THE NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1988, at 5, col. 1.
84. Id. at 7, col. 1.
85. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300.
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Toledo. Although many courts have construed 21 U.S.C. § 881
as a civil statute, nowhere is it explicitly stated that the statute
was intended as such, nor has the Supreme Court ever defini-
tively ruled on this issue.86 While the Supreme Court has yet
to answer whether 21 U.S.C. § 881 is meant as a civil or crimi-
nal forfeiture statute, many of the nation's other courts have
given their answers, asserting that the statute is civil and there-
fore undeserving of a proportionality analysis.
V. Is § 881 CIVIL OR CRIMINAL?
A. One Court's Approach
In U.S. v. Santoro, defendant's property, consisting of
approximately 26 acres of land and valued in excess of
$100,000 was forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). s7
On four separate occasions, Mrs. Santoro sold small amounts
of cocaine to an undercover officer. The government subse-
quently filed a forfeiture action against the defendant's real
property based on the alleged criminal conduct of Mrs. San-
toro. One of defendant's challenges was that 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) is a criminal, rather than a civil, provision. 8 The
court said that a two-step analysis was appropriate in determin-
ing whether the provision is civil or criminal. First the court
must determine whether Congress indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, if it
is decided that Congress indicated its intention to establish a
civil penalty, it must be ascertained whether the statutory
scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate
that intention. 9
As to the first inquiry, the court in Santoro, said that Con-
gress obviously intended 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) to be a civil
statute. The court based this finding upon the fact that the
statute expressly provides for the use of the rules of civil admi-
ralty, as well as the use of the civil procedures of the customs
law.90 Congress chose not to prescribe in section 881 the steps
to be followed in effectuating a forfeiture; instead, Congress
86. See U.S. v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1987) ("...
[Tihe Supreme Court, however, has never developed a principled
explanation of the distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture. While the
Court has made formalistic distinctions . . . this distinction has become
difficult through application of certain constitutional safeguards to some
forfeiture actions but not others").
87. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 1543.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (b), (d).
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incorporated by reference the procedures of forfeiture under
an already existing body of civil forfeiture law-in this case,
customs law.9' Further, some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. D.KG. Appaloosas, Inc., point to the existence
of 21 U.S.C. § 853, which is an express criminal forfeiture pro-
vision, which was added to Title 21 in 1984.92 The argument
states that if § 881 was intended to provide for criminal forfei-
ture, then Congress would not have enacted § 853, specifically
providing for criminal forfeiture. The Santoro court supported
this theory and held that § 881 was civil.
Regarding the second step in the analysis as to whether the
provision is criminal or civil, the court said the "clearest proof"
must be shown that the effects of the statute are so punitive
that the forfeiture cannot be treated as civil. 93 In the case of
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court listed factors which,
while not dispositive, were helpful in determining whether an
act of Congress is so punitive that it negates Congress' inten-
tion that it be civil.94 These factors included: whether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribu-
tion and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.9 5
The court in Santoro stated that although the punitive
aspects of any forfeiture are self-evident, the remedial, non-
punitive purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 881 were extremely strong.96
The court felt that only two of the above mentioned criteria
could really support the defendant's contention that 21 U.S.C.
91. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 866 F.2d 532, 543 (1987).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 543.
94. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
(Pursuant to section 401 (j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, Mendoza-Martinez
was ordered deported as an alien on the ground that he had lost his
citizenship by remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in
time of war for the purpose of evading or avoiding service in the nation's
armed forces. He sued for relief claiming that section 401(j) was
unconstitutional. The Court agreed, holding that section 401 (j) was punitive
and as such could not constitutionally stand, because it lacked the procedural
safeguards which the Constitution commands.
95. Id. at 168-69.
96. Santoro, 886 F.2d at 1543.
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§ 881 is a criminal statute. First of all, it does have a deterring
effect and second, its operation was triggered by Mrs. Santoro's
criminal conduct. However, the court found neither of these
facts to be persuasive. Instead, they focused on the "remedial"
aspects of the statute. The court said, "[tihese remedial pur-
poses include removing the incentive to engage in the drug
trade by denying drug dealers the proceeds of ill-gotten gains,
stripping the drug trade of its instrumentalities, including
money, and financing Government programs designed to elim-
inate drug-trafficking."9 7 Therefore, the court concluded that
in light of these broad, overriding remedial purposes, the
effects of the provision were not so punitive as to negate the
clear intention of Congress that 21 U.S.C. § 881 provide civil
sanctions.9"
The discussion above (section II) established that civil for-
feiture does indeed exact a penalty. Because it exacts a penalty,
§ 881, is, at least in part, penal in nature. But is § 881 more
penal than remedial, such that an eighth-amendment propor-
tionality analysis is required? The Santoro court, while acknowl-
edging the punitive effects of the statute, held that the statute
was, nevertheless, more remedial in nature than penal. How-
ever, the Santoro court was in error.
B. The Bill of Attainder Cases
Civil forfeiture statutes, as they are currently applied, are
much more penal than remedial. "There is no bright-line test
to determine whether a statute is criminal (penal) or civil
(remedial) and of course, to an individual who loses his or her
property through forfeiture, the loss is no less a punishment
than is a criminal fine."99 Courts have previously tried to ascer-
tain the intent of Congress, considering Congressional intent
to be the principle criterion for determining whether a particu-
lar penalty is civil or criminal. But this deference to Congress
is a bit strange, as one commentator agrees, saying, "whether a
particular penalty is civil or criminal in nature seems a question
of legal philosophy that the Supreme Court is best equipped to
address . . . it is odd, therefore, that the court would defer so
97. Id. at 1544.
98. For a good discussion as to how the factors set forth in Mendoza-
Martinez apply to civil forfeiture, see Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 30, at
50. (arguing that forfeiture under section 881 involves an affirmative
disability and punishment, the aims of retribution and deterrence are being
promoted, and that section 881 applies to behavior that is already criminal.);
Fear, supra note 9, at 1160-63.
99. Herpel, supra note 11, at 36.
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heavily to Congress's classification of forfeiture as civil rather
than criminal."' 00
The intention of Congress, while helpful, is by no means
dispositive. Congress may very well have intended § 881 to be
a remedial statute, but Congress does not have the authority to
circumvent the judicial process to inflict punishment, which is
what happens under civil forfeiture. This principle is based on
the system of checks and balances employed by our govern-
ment. The system was envisioned as a protection against tyr-
anny. "For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given
policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative
enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation,
no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked
will."' 0' With civil forfeiture Congress is overstepping its
bounds and imposing punishment without the safeguards of
the judicial process. Illustrative of this point, and analogous to
the problems faced by civil forfeiture laws, is the prohibition on
Bills of Attainder.
A Bill of Attainder, broadly speaking, is a legislative act
inflicting punishment without judicial trial. Specifically, legisla-
tive acts that apply either to a named individual or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attain-
der prohibited by the Constitution.' 2 In the bill of attainder
cases, as in some of the civil forfeiture cases, the courts have
attempted to determine whether the effect of the statutes in
question was to punish.
At issue in Cummings v. The State of Missouri, was the consti-
tutionality of an amendment to the Missouri Constitution of
1865, which provided that no one could engage in a number of
specified professions (Cummings was a priest) unless he first
swore that he had taken no part in the rebellion against the
Union.'0 3 The Supreme Court struck down the provision as an
impermissible bill of attainder. The Court said it was a legisla-
tive act which inflicted punishment on a specific group; clergy-
men who had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could
not truthfully take the oath.' 4 The State of Missouri argued
that the provision only prescribed a qualification for holding
certain offices, and practicing certain callings, and that it was
100. Id.
101. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
102. Id. at 448-49 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)).
103. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (4 Wall.) (1866).
104. Id.
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therefore within the power of the state to adopt it.' 0 5 The
Court held, however, that such requirements have no possible
relation to fitness for particular pursuits and professions. The
Court said, "there can be no connection between the fact that
Mr. Cummings entered or left the State of Missouri to avoid
enrollment or draft ... and his fitness to teach the doctrines or
administer the sacraments of his church."' 6 The Court
astutely noted that the oath was required not to ascertain
whether parties were qualified for their respective callings or
whether any of the several acts designated indicated unfitness
for the callings, but because it was thought that the several acts
deserved punishment.'0 7 The Court held that the disabilities
created by the constitution of Missouri must be regarded as
penalties - and constitute punishment.'0 8
In United States v. Brown, the respondent was convicted
under § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959, which made it a crime for one who belonged
to the Communist party or who was a member of the party dur-
ing the preceding five years willfully to serve as a member of
the executive board of a labor organization.'0 9 The Supreme
Court held the section was an unconstitutional bill of attain-
der."' The Solicitor General argued that § 504 was not a bill
of attainder because the prohibition it imposed did not consti-
tute "punishment," urging that the statute was enacted for pre-
ventive rather than retributive reasons, and that its aim was not
to punish."' The Court said it would be archaic to limit the
definition of "punishment" to "retribution," noting that pun-
ishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative,
deterrent - and preventive." 2 The Court said, "one of the
reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep
them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make
imprisonment any the less punishment." '
These cases vividly illustrate that Acts of Congress must be
careful not to inflict punishment, for that is the province of the
Judiciary. Through civil forfeiture Congress has exercised its
right to designate punishable conduct in an impermissible way.
105. Id. at 318.
106. Id. at 319.
107. Id. at 320.
108. Id.
109. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 456.
112. Id. at 458.
113. Id.
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There is essentially no difference between criminal and civil
forfeiture, and "through the simple expedient of calling a par-
ticular forfeiture sanction 'civil,' Congress has effectively cir-
cumvented the Constitution in the application of that
sanction."' 114 The effect, and aim, of civil forfeiture is to deter
and to punish. In spite of the remedial purposes it may serve,
the overriding result of civil forfeiture is the infliction of a
penalty.
The rationale of the Santoro court, and others who argue
that civil forfeiture is remedial in nature, would be sound were
the statute confined in its application to situations where the
forfeited property was clearly obtained with proceeds of ill-got-
ten gains or was an instrumentality of the drug trade. Unfortu-
nately, the statute has been applied much more broadly to
reach property which is not directly related to drug traffick-
ing.11 5 This result occurs when ordinary citizens buy small
quantities of drugs and subsequently forfeit their cars. The
first time or casual user most likely did not purchase his or her
car with the proceeds of ill-gotten gains, nor is he or she
involved in drug trafficking. People can just as easily walk to
the site where they will purchase the drugs. Just because they
drive does not mean that their car becomes an instrumentality
of the drug trade subjecting it to forfeiture.
C. The Practical Problem of Characterizing § 881 as Civil
The United States District Court, for the District of New
Hampshire, in U.S. v. One 1972 Datsun, recognized this problem
in the application of forfeiture statutes.' 1 6 The court first cited
114. Herpel, supra note 11, at 36.
115. A crucial distinction in this essay is made between those who are
in the business of buying and selling drugs on a large scale and individuals
who purchase drugs for personal consumption only. The former are referred
to as "drug traffickers," a term which is used throughout this paper. This
article does not attack forfeiture laws as applied to these people, but rather, it
is aimed at the latter category of people, who's personal property that is
subject to forfeiiture is most often not substantially connected to their
purchases of drugs.
116. United States v. One 1972 Datsun Vehicle Id. No. LB
1100355950, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974). (The claimant's Datsun was
seized in connection with his arrest for the sale of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide
(LSD, a narcotic drug). The Government filed a Complaint for Forfeiture
claiming that the car was used to facilitate the illegal sale of a controlled drug
and that the car should, therefore, be forfeited to the United States under 21
U.S.C. § 881. The court did not allow forfeiture of the vehicle because it was
not substantially connected to the commission of the underlying criminal
activity.)
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cases which established the principle that a vehicle, in order to
be forfeited, must have some substantial connection to, or be
instrumental in, the commission of the underlying criminal
activity which the statute seeks to prevent.' 17 The court said it
was appropriate in every forfeiture to ask whether the use of
the car as established by the record is so connected with the
allegedly illicit activity as to subject the car to forfeiture.""
The Datsun court also said that forfeiture statutes were
intended only to penalize those people significantly involved in
a criminal enterprise.'' 9 The court stated, "... one of the best
ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocket-
books of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles, and
aircraft may be termed the operating tools of [drug] peddlers,
and often represent major capital investments . . . [f]orfeiture
of these means of transportation provide an effective brake on
the traffic in narcotic drugs." ' The court relied on this analy-
sis in finding that:
a purpose of vehicle forfeiture in the enforcement of nar-
cotics laws is to prevent the flow of narcotics by depriving
narcotics peddlers of the operating tools of their trade.
That purpose will not be greatly furthered by forfeiture
in this case. The Government has not alleged that claim-
ant uses the Datsun as part of the modus operandi of an
ongoing criminal narcotics enterprise, nor has it alleged
that the Datsun has been specifically adapted for illicit
narcotics activity. It is not clear that forfeiture of the
vehicle will help to prevent the illegal sale of narcotics
any more than forfeiture of any number of claimant's per-
sonal effects which facilitate his ability to deal with such
commonplace and everyday problems as
transportation.' 2'
The court concluded that "it is important to require that
derivative contraband be substantially and instrumentally con-
nected with illegal behavior before it is subject to forfeiture.
Otherwise, the Government, by electing to proceed against
117. Id. at 1203. The court noted two cases which established that an
automobile used only for the personal convenience of the owner as
transportation to the site of the illicit operation is not subject to seizure. See
also U.S. v. Lane Motor Co., 344 U.S. 630 (1953) and United States v.
Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180 (3rd Cir. 1950).
118. Datsun, citing Simpson v. U.S., 272 F.2d at 230 (9th Cir. 1959).
119. United States v. One 1972 Datsun, citing U.S. v. U.S. Coin and
Currency, 410 U.S. at 721-22 (1971).
120. 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 2953-54.
121. 378 F. Supp. at 1205.
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suspects via the forfeiture route, could deprive citizens of the
constitutionally-mandated safeguards which surround the crim-
inal process."122
VI. QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Unfortunately, the worries of the court in Datsun have
become extremely real. Many citizens subject to forfeiture pro-
ceedings have not been given full Constitutional protection
because of the "civil" label given to the proceedings. Some
claimants have tried to argue that such forfeitures, if not
viewed as "criminal" by the court, should be viewed as "quasi-
criminal" because although it is a civil proceeding, clearly the
object of a civil forfeiture proceeding, like its criminal counter-
part, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the
law. 123
Courts often cite Boyd v. United States '24 in support of the
proposition that all forfeitures are "criminal" in nature. This
famous case stands for the priniple that a proceeding to forfeit
a person's goods for an offense against the laws, though civil in
form, and whether in rem or in personam, is a "criminal case."' 25
The Court said that, because
suits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred by the com-
mission of offenses against the law, are of this 'quasi-
criminal' nature, we think that they are within the reason
of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the fourth
amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of
the fifth amendment which declares that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.12
6
Although the decision in Boyd has not been extended beyond
cases involving the fourth and fifth amendments,' 27 the Court
in Boyd implied that all constitutional safeguards should be
applicable to forfeiture:
122. Id. at 1206.
123. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
124. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
125. Id. at 616.
126. Id. at 634-35.
127. United States v. Regan 232 U.S. 37 (1914) (According to the
Court, Boyd is limited in scope to the fifth amendment's guarantee against
compulsory self-incrimination). In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court extended
Boyd to the fourth amendment.
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Although the owner of goods, sought to be forfeited by a
proceeding in rem, is not the nominal party, he is, never-
theless, the substantial party to the suit; he certainly is so,
after making claim and defense; and, in a case like the
present, he is entitled to all the privileges which apper-
tain to a person who is prosecuted for a forfeiture of his
property by reason of committing a criminal offense. 2 '
Nearly eighty years after the Boyd decision, the Supreme
Court again addressed the argument that forfeiture proceed-
ings are quasi-criminal in character and are directed toward
penalizing a person for committing an offense against the law.
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a
vehicle was forfeited after two law enforcement officials from
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board stopped the car after
observing that the car was quite low in the rear.' 2 9 The officers
searched the car and found in the trunk 31 cases of liquor not
bearing Pennsylvania tax seals. The car and the liquor were
subsequently seized and the driver was charged with violation
of Pennsylvania law.'30 The Pennsylvania Court deemed this
proceeding as civil in nature. However, the Supreme Court,
relying on Boyd, said this was a quasi-criminal proceeding. Mr.
Justice Goldberg, who delivered the Court's opinion, pointed
out that a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character
because its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize a
person for the commission of an offense against the law. 3 ' In
this case, if the defendant had been convicted of any of the
charges against him, the most he could have been fined would
have been $500, yet the car which he forfeited, regardless of his
guilt or innocence, was valued at $1,000.
In United States v. United States Coin & Currency,'3 2 the
defendant had been convicted of failing to register as a gam-
bler and to pay the related gambling tax required by federal
law. 13 3 Forfeiture proceedings were instituted to obtain $8,674
which defendant had in his possession at the time of his
arrest. 34 The Court, responding to the government's charac-
128. 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
129. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 698.
132. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971).
133. Id. at 716 (Defendant was convicted under 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411,
4412, 4901).
134. Id.
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terization that this was a civil proceeding wrote, "[firom the
relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference
between a man who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the
money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a
'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of con-
duct."' 3 5 The Court reasoned that the privilege against self-
incrimination under the fifth amendment was equally applica-
ble in both situations. The government contended that the
guilt or innocence of the owner of the money was irrelevant. In
this case we again see the bizarre notion that the property itself
is guilty. Indeed it was the money in this case which was the
formal respondent and the government's complaint charged
the money with the commission of an actionable wrong.'
3 6
The Court too, recognized that it was fiction to believe that
inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing. 3 7
The Court ultimately held that the fifth amendment privilege
could properly be invoked in this case.' 38 The Court said that
the forfeiture statutes, when viewed in their entirety,- are
intended to penalize only persons significantly involved in a
criminal enterprise.
139
Unfortunately the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
give full scope to Boyd." 0 The Boyd decision has remained lim-
ited to questions involving the fourth and fifth amendments.
However, this reasoning can, and should, be applied to eighth
amendment issues as well. If forfeitures such as the ones previ-
ously discussed are "criminal" enough in nature that they are
deserving of scrutiny and protection under the fourth and fifth
amendments, they should get eighth amendment scrutiny and
protection as well.
The characterization of certain forfeiture proceedings as
"quasi-criminal" is thus troublesome. It has led to adjudica-
tion of forfeiture cases on an ad hoc basis. The Court should
explain why it applies some Constitutional provisions, and not
others. If the Constitution does not create a hierarchy among
135. Id. at 718.
136. Id. at 720, n. 5 ("The libel charged that 'o]in one or more of the
aforementioned dates .. .aforesaid respondents [i.e., the money] had been
used and were intended to be used in violation of the Internal Revenue Laws
of the United States of America... WHEREFORE FRANK E. McDONALD,
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois ... prays ... That
aforesaid respondents be adjudged and decreed forfeited to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA.' App. 5-6").
137. Id. at 719.
138. Id. at 722.
139. Id. at 721-22.
140. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
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the various rights provided to a criminal defendant, why should
the courts?' 4 ' During criminal proceedings the court is not
allowed to pick and choose which constitutional provisions it
will apply to each case; every defendant is entitled to the appli-
cation of every Constitutional provision.
If courts such as those in Boyd and Plymouth Sedan, deter-
mine that a forfeiture proceeding is criminal in nature, then the
defendant should be awarded the protection of all Constitu-
tional rights due a criminal defendant. 42 On the other hand, if
a court determines that the forfeiture proceeding is civil then
that court is, as one author so succinctly put it, "engaging in
unjustifiable activism by awarding such rights to the civil
claimants." 143
Clearly, forfeiture is a penalty; it is a penalty imposed on a
person based upon a showing of guilt using the lowest standard
of proof available. Should the person be indicted and go to
trial, he will be prosecuted using criminal proceedings and will
be subject to criminal sanctions if found guilty. It just does not
make sense to say that seizing a car is "civil" in nature, but
everything that happens afterwards is "criminal" in nature.
VII. THE RELUCTANCE TO APPLY THE DISPROPORTIONALITY
ARGUMENT
The classification of certain forfeitures as civil has
extremely important ramifications. Exempting such proceed-
ings from the eighth amendment results in penalties which, in
many cases, are disproportionate to the offense committed. In
many forfeiture cases the defendants have asserted that the for-
feiture of their car, boat or other property was violative of the
eighth amendment. However, courts have been able to circum-
vent this problem by simply saying that the forfeiture is civil
and therefore, the eighth amendment does not apply. 1 44
A few courts have admitted the viability of the eighth
amendment argument, but hold that regardless of whether it is
applicable or not, the seizing of a car, boat, even land, is simply
not "harsh enough" to invoke the eighth amendment privi-
lege. '4 5 Indeed, one court said, "we find the proportionality
141. See Fear, supra note 9, at 1160.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See cases discussed supra at note 52.
145. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
682-87 (1974). (Forfeiture of $20,000 yacht based on discovery of single
marijuana cigarette on board under Puerto Rican Statute modeled after 21
U.S.C. § 881); United States v. 1985 BMW 635 CSI, 677 F. Supp. 1039 (C.D.
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between the value of the forfeited property and the severity of
the injury inflicted by its use to be irrelevant. "146 One case
illustrative of this approach is United States v. 1985 BMW. 147
The defendant admitted to transporting 6.23 grams of cocaine
and 2.78 grams of marijuana in her vehicle, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4). This statute, as mentioned earlier, provides
for forfeiture of property, including vehicles, "which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facili-
tate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or conceal-
ment of controlled substances."
' 148
The defendant argued that the court should impose a
monetary penalty in lieu of forfeiture due to the small amounts
of drugs involved and the high value of the automobile.14' The
court said there was no statutory authority for such an alterna-
tive.1 50 More importantly, said the court, there is ample
authority holding that the amount of controlled substances
involved is not relevant and that even a very small amount will
not prevent the automobile from being seized.' 5 ' This notion
was established firmly in United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S,
which upheld the forfeiture of an expensive vehicle which was
transporting only 226 milligrams of marijuana. The court cited
many cases holding that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no
matter how small the quantity of contraband. 52
Cal. 1987); United States v. One 1982 28' Int'l Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch NISKU, 548 F.2d 8, 11 (1st
Cir. 1977).
146. United States v. Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Five and
No/100 ($12,585.00) in U.S. Currency, 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989). (The
court said there was no merit in any de minimis argument that the sale of a
relatively small amount of cocaine does not warrant forfeiture of the house.
All that is required to warrant forfeiture is a sufficient connection between the
house and illegal activity. The so-called nexus test is not a measure of the
amount of drugs or drug trafficking, therefore, proportionality is irrelevant.)
147. United States v. 1985 BMW, 677 F. Supp. 1039 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).
149. BMW, at 1040. The amount of drugs was 6.23 grams of cocaine
and 2.78 grams of concentrated cannabis. The claimant asserted that the
value of the automobile was approximately $35,000.
150. Id.
151. BMW, 677 F. Supp. at 1039.
152. United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS, Etc., 670 F.2d 810 (9th
Cir. 1979). (The courts have uniformly held that a vehicle is subject to
forfeiture no matter how small the quantity of contraband found. E.g.,
United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile, 256 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1958);
United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe Auto, 364 F. Supp. 745, 748-49
(E.D. Pa. 1973)).
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A more recent case solidifying this precept is United States
v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz. '53 Under New York law, the posses-
sion of less than 25 grams of marijuana has been decriminal-
ized. 154 Nevertheless, the court upheld the forfeiture of a
Mercedes, although all that was found in the car were the
remains of one marijuana cigarette. 155 This result is the same
as in the Plymouth case, where the value of the defendant's for-
feited car was double the maximum amount he would have
been fined had he been subsequently convicted. Regardless of
what this type of proceeding is labeled, such results are inequi-
table because they are disproportionate.
Defendant's second argument in the BMW case was that
imposing forfeiture would violate the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. It is not surprising that the
court avoided this by saying that this statute provides for a for-
feiture proceeding that is civil and remedial as opposed to
criminal and punitive, and thus an eighth amendment analysis
is not required. The court said that even if an eighth amend-
ment argument was appropriate, there would be no basis to
deny forfeiture. The applicable test, the court said, was the one
applied by the Ninth Circuit, which is whether " 'the interest
ordered forfeited is ... grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed .... " -,156 The court found that forfeiting a $35,000
automobile which was used to transport 6.23 grams of cocaine
and 2.78 grams of marijuana was not " 'grossly disproportion-
ate to the offense committed.' 157
VIII. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT
FORFEITURE LAW
This essay addresses the fundamental problem with cur-
rent civil forfeiture laws, which is that many forfeitures result in
a loss of property that is disproportionate to the offense.
There are some additional problems with forfeiture laws worth
noting. This section will briefly address a few other concerns
with civil forfeiture.
153. United States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F.2d 2 (2nd Cir.
1988).
154. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, 221.10 (McKinney 1982).
155. 846 F.2d at 4-5.
156. 677 F. Supp. at 1042, quoting United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d
1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987).
157. 677 F. Supp. at 1040. (The court stated, "[i]t can hardly be said
that such a forfeiture amounts to either 'cruel' or 'unusual' punishments.")
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A. Broadened Scope
As mentioned before, forfeiture has been available as a
tool for law enforcement officials for a long time. When legis-
lation enabling civil forfeitures was first enacted it was primar-
ily aimed at drug traffickers.158 Congress' purpose in enacting
§ 881 was to take the profit out of the drug trade. 59 Due to the
sweeping language of most statutes, however, the scope of leg-
islation has broadened to encompass individuals who certainly
do not derive their livelihood from the drug trade and "courts
have been fairly unanimous in concluding that they should fol-
low the broad language of the statute even in cases involving
personal users."' 6 As Florida Circuit Judge Lance Andrews
puts it, "[I]t's really gotten a little ridiculous . . . [t]he whole
intent was to use this thing against organized crime at all levels
- not against people who can't chew gum and walk at the same
time." 161
A primary reason for expanding forfeiture statutes to
reach beyond drug traffickers may be the recognition by offi-
cials that the most effective way to fight the war on drugs is to
curb demand, in addition to trying to stop the supply. In the
1980's the so-called "zero tolerance program" was instituted as
an all out attack on the demand side of the drug industry.' 6 2
Prior to this, the government had focused its efforts on the sup-
ply side. Fighting the demand for drugs is extremely important
if the war on drugs is to be won. However, if the government
focuses the majority of its energy on forfeiting private property
that is not instrumental in furthering the drug trade, (i.e. prop-
erty used only as a means of transportation) it not only
decreases the amount of resources available to fight drug sell-
ers and lessens the likelihood that the dealers will get caught,
158. See Fear, supra note 9, notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
159. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4624-25. Revisions to the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1984. See United States v.
One Clipper Bow Ketch NISKU, 548 F.2d at 12 (1st Cir. 1977). ("While it is
true that Congress' expressed concern was with trafficking, this does not
preclude the possibility that other conduct was also intended to fall within the
statutes.") The court also said that it could not be denied that drug
trafficking was at the core of the conduct at which the forfeiture statutes are
directed, and the justification for imposing forfeiture in cases involving solely
possession of contraband for personal use is far less apparent. However, the
court did not feel it had discretion in the matter as "the uniform course of
judicial decisions indicates that it is not the role of the courts to mitigate the
harshness of these statutes."
160. Fear, supra note 9, at 1178.
161. Strasser, supra note 10, at 26, col. 3.
162. Fear, supra note 9, at 1151.
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but it means that the statute is not serving the remedial pur-
poses for which it was intended.
B. Innocence is not a Defense
One criticism of civil forfeiture is that many times the true
owner of the forfeited property is innocent of any wrongdoing.
Examples of this include lessors of boats, and friends or par-
ents of children borrowing cars. However, the guilt or inno-
cence of the owner of the property is irrelevant, because, the
traditional rationale has been that the property itself, not the
owner, is guilty. "Innocence [of the claimant,] in and of itself,
is an insufficient defense to forfeiture"'"6 and "has almost uni-
formly been rejected."'" It should be remembered, though,
that sometimes in the law, traditional rationales must give way
in order that equity and justice be achieved.
C. Law Enforcement Problems
A growing criticism of the forfeiture policy is that it pro-
vides incentives for law enforcement personnel to focus their
energies on asset forfeiture, to the detriment of efforts spent
fighting other types of crime. Such a practice results in a high
number of arrests and a large amount of seized assets, but fails
to address the crucial issue of drug use itself. One newspaper
said, "[l]aw enforcement agencies can become so dependent on
the millions of dollars in cash and other assets they get for-
feited from drug dealers that the seizures become more impor-
tant than fighting drug abuse . . "..-165 Another newspaper
said, "[florfeiture is a useful sanction, [b]ut it could easily be
preserved without causing dollar signs to dance before the eyes
of local police."' 166
In Florida, Circuit Judge Lance Andrews says, "[w]e don't
do big drug cases down here . .. [w]hy spend time building a
big wiretap case and following people around when you can
run out on the street and grab 20 cars in a night?"' 67 Not only
does a high number of forfeitures look good for law enforce-
ment agencies, but when the agencies themselves get to keep
the assets they seize, there is substantial incentive in pursuing
163. United States v. One (1) 1957 Rockwell Acro Commander 680
Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1982).
164. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 684
(1974).
165. U.S.A. Today, April 11, 1990, at 3A, col. 1.
166. Anderson, supra note 4.
167. Strasser, supra note 10, at 6, col. 3.
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forfeitures. Unfortunately this may result in fewer resources
being devoted to other types of crime, which need just as much
attention as the drug problem. Arthur Nehrbass, the chief of
the Dade County, Florida Police Department's organized crime
unit, realized this potential danger and warned, "there's noth-
ing that can destroy a forfeiture statute faster than the legisla-
ture's opinion that it's made officers bounty hunters.""'
One commentator has noted, "although there is superficial
justice in rewarding local initiative, the law, perversely, makes
police departments financially dependent on the drug dealing
they are supposed to curtail." 69 Further, since law enforce-
ment personnel do not have the resources to arrest every viola-
tor, there is the possibility of selective enforcement. "[lIt
certainly could cloud the judgment of local police, leading
them to investigate suspects based on their assets rather than
their threat to the community. "1 10 "An increase in police dis-
cretion results in the police having more power to make unre-
viewable decisions. Policy decisions should be made by judges
and legislators rather than by individual officers."''
IX. CONCLUSION
While criminal forfeiture is increasingly being subjected to
eighth amendment scrutiny, 17 2 civil forfeiture has survived
eighth amendment challenge. This essay has attempted to
demonstrate that the basis for this immunity, the guilty prop-
erty fiction, is merely a relic of a bygone era, and is solely a
mechanism used to accomplish in a civil proceeding, what may
not be accomplished in a criminal one.
As applied to drug traffickers and drug rings, forfeiture
should be used very aggressively to deprive these people of any
property they have obtained through their business of peddling
illicit substances. In addition to acting as a deterrent, forfeiture
used in this way serves important remedial purposes. Stripping
drug dealers of the instruments used in the drug trade will cer-
168. Id. at 27, col. 1. (The article also listed some specific concerns in
this area: the lower burden of proof required in a civil case, combined with
the benefits of forfeiture, can lull law enforcement into lax investigative
standards on criminal cases, agents can be sidetracked into profitable
forfeiture actions rather than pursuing convictions, informants can be
critically compromised if they have testified, agencies can become more
reluctant to share information that may now have an actual monetary value).
169. Anderson, supra note 4.
170. Id.
171. Fear, supra note 9, at 1179.
172. Controversial, supra note 50, at 5, col. 3.
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tainly help prevent such items from being used in the future.
This rationale justifies forfeiture of equipment used to manu-
facture drugs, property where drugs are processed and stored,
any means of transportation, and money. This was the original
purpose of forfeiture statutes and should not be curtailed in
any way. However, in certain instances the policy must be
reformed where it exceeds the bounds of fairness.
Consider this hypothetical case. On his lunch hour, a
young executive drives, in his BMW, to purchase 5 grams of
marijuana. A policeman subsequently pulls him over, discovers
the drugs, and his car, valued at over $50,000, is forfeited. The
man who sold the young executive drugs drives a Mercedes,
which he purchased using the proceeds from his drug-related
activities. He has been the major supplier of drugs in the area
for two years. When he is caught, he too, will forfeit his car. In
the former case, the forfeiture is not warranted, in the latter, it
is. Assume that both men were convicted. The maximum fine
the young executive would pay under criminal law is $2,000,
yet he lost property valued at twenty-five times that amount! In
the case of the drug dealer, however, he would have lost his car
anyway because it was purchased with illegally obtained "drug
money," and would have been forfeited under criminal stat-
utes. It is precisely this type of scenario which calls for a pro-
portionality analysis.
The two offenders are vastly different, yet they both suffer
the same penalty. Where an individual's only connection to
drugs is through personal consumption, forfeiture of property
does not serve any compelling remedial interest. The interests
truly being served are those of deterrence and retribution.
Such forfeitures are criminal punishment, they have been char-
acterized as "quasi-criminal" by this nation's highest court,
and, accordingly, should receive the full protection of the
Constitution. '7 3
173. Darmstadter and Mackoff, supra note 30, at 52 ("regarding cases
where the only connection between the owner of the vehicle and drugs is that
of personal consumption . . ." In these cases, property taken is generally a
conveyance that has been used to transport or conceal small amounts of
drugs. The forfeiture of such property serves no purpose other than
deterrence and retribution. Seizure of an expensive automobile ... serves no
remedial purpose, and is far greater than any criminal sanction that would be
imposed. In contrast with the case of the dealer in controlled substances, it is
a simple matter to conceive of less burdensome alternatives to forfeiture of a
possessor's property. Confiscation of such property must be regarded as
criminal punishment and should require the full constitutional protection
associated with such a proceeding.")
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Over one hundred years ago the Supreme Court said, "the
character of a sanction imposed as punishment is not changed
by the mode in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or
a criminal prosecution."'"74 Now, one hundred years later the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that, "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can be explained only also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment."'' 75 In spite of the asserted
remedial benefits of forfeitures, the overriding purpose and
effect of civil forfeitures is deterrence and punishment, regard-
less of the form in which they are executed. Where such for-
feitures result in disproportionate punishment, the effect is an
intrusion on a Constitutionally protected right. As one court
put it, "[tihe eighth amendment does not provide a bright line
separating punishment that is permissible from that which is
not. But a court may not turn its back on a constitutional con-
straint simply because it is difficult to apply."' 176
Certain forfeitures offend the common sense notion of
fairness, as is the case when a $50,000 car is forfeited upon a
finding of a minuscule amount of drugs or when a 2.5 million
dollar yacht is seized upon a finding of less than one-tenth of
an ounce of marijuana.' 77 Fair play and equity can be achieved
under civil forfeiture if forfeitures are not allowed that will
result in the kind of gross disproportionality described above.
The proposed amendment to § 881 would alleviate the
problem of disproportionate forfeitures, in certain cases.
Before property is forfeited under § 881, a myriad of factors
must be considered: what quantity of drugs is involved, the
past record of the offender, the value of the property forfeited,
the connection between the property and the drug trade and
whether the individual is a drug trafficker, or habitual seller of
drugs, or a citizen buying drugs for personal consumption.
Where the quantity of drugs is large, the person has been con-
victed for previous drug offenses, and the property is substan-
tially related to the "drug business," or has been purchased
with drug money, the law would require forfeiture. Where,
however, the quantity of drugs is small, the person has no prior
convictions for drug-related offenses and the property is not
directly connected to the drug business, but is merely a form of
transportation, forfeiture should not be allowed. Of course,
174. United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1881).
175. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).
176. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987).
177. Luxury Yacht is Seized with Bit of Marijuana, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988,
at 16, col. 6.
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many cases will fall within the "gray" area in between these
extremes. When someone regularly purchases small quantities
of drugs from his or her home, the home may be said to be
directly related to the drug business, but buying a few grams of
marijuana now and then for personal use does not warrant the
forfeiture of a person's home.
This article cannot establish an exact proportionality scale
to be applied in all forfeiture cases. However, it is possible to
determine that a certain forfeiture is disproportionate in light
of the surrounding circumstances. Many people would agree,
using nothing more than common sense, that many of the for-
feitures discussed in this essay are disproportionate. Legisla-
tures must enact civil forfeiture laws which provide guidelines
for courts to follow in determining whether a forfeiture is
disproportionate.
Such a system would be similar to the sentencing guide-
lines set up for criminal cases. For a given quantity of drugs
the statute would specify, in terms of dollars, a minimum and
maximum amount of property which could be forfeited. This
system would give the court a range to work with in deciding
individual cases. The courts would then look at the other rele-
vant factors and would decide if a given forfeiture is
disproportionate.
In 1988, Milton Friedman wrote a letter to drug czar Wil-
liam'Bennett, warning about the threat to freedom posed by
proposals to expand the role of the criminal justice system and
the military in the war on drugs. '7s One author concluded that,
"through their impact on property rights, the drug forfeiture
laws have already eroded fundamental freedoms. The fact that
this has occurred so easily, with barely a whimper of protest
from the courts and virtually no opposition from thoughtful
commentators, gives real credence to Friedman's warnings
about where the war on drugs may take us."' 79
This essay challenges civil forfeiture by arguing that not
only is it based on a fictional doctrine and fundamentally
unfair, but that civil forfeiture is an unwarranted infringement
on the property rights of private citizens and an impermissible
erosion of the eighth amendment. This essay attempts to limit
civil forfeiture by providing a practical amendment to § 881. 80
178. Herpel, supra note 11, at 35.
179. Id.
180. This Article was completed before Harmelin v. Michigan, 59
U.S.L.W. 4839 (U.S. June 23, 1991), was handed down. Harmelin casts some
doubt on the continuing vitality of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), a
case on which the author relies on pp. 856, 860-61 supra.
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